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The information contents of memory are the cornerstone of the most influen-
tial models in cognition. To illustrate, consider that in predictive coding, a
prediction implies that specific information is propagated down from
memory through the visual hierarchy. Likewise, recognizing the input
implies that sequentially accrued sensory evidence is successfully matched
with memorized information (categorical knowledge). Although the existing
models of prediction, memory, sensory representation and categorical
decision are all implicitly cast within an information processing framework,
it remains a challenge to precisely specify what this information is, and there-
fore where, when and how the architecture of the brain dynamically processes
it to produce behaviour. Here, we review a framework that addresses these
challenges for the studies of perception and categorization–stimulus infor-
mation representation (SIR). We illustrate how SIR can reverse engineer
the information contents of memory from behavioural and brain measures
in the context of specific cognitive tasks that involve memory. We discuss
two specific lessons from this approach that generally apply to memory
studies: the importance of task, to constrain what the brain does, and of stimu-
lus variations, to identify the specific information contents that are memorized,
predicted, recalled and replayed.
This article is part of the TheoMurphy meeting issue ‘Memory reactivation:
replaying events past, present and future’.1. Introduction
The machinery that performs visual cognition has an extraordinary range of
capabilities that is supported by the most powerful of sensory systems. Starting
with the high-dimensional retinal input that comprises 150 M rods and cones, a
large proportion of the cortex (30% to 60%) is then dedicated to accomplishing
the feats of visual cognition. Among these is the ability to flexibly reduce the
high-dimensional, highly variable input to flexibly categorize it to produce
adaptive behaviours [1–3]. To illustrate, consider the street scene shown on
the left-hand side of figure 1. The brain can perform numerous categorization
tasks on this image: it can identify the country, city and street; the houses
and shops; the moving and stationary cars, their makes and models, age and
condition; the people shopping or those just passing by, as well as their gait,
identity, emotion and social interactions; it can also infer the weather, time of
day, season and so on. These are only very few of many categorizations that
our brains perform apparently continuously and effortlessly.
To accomplish this feat, current models in the cognitive sciences assume that
the categorization processes performed by the brain use memory represen-
tations, both to predict the incoming stimulus (e.g. a street, the type of a car
or the emotion of a face) and also to categorize it (e.g. as ‘Byres Road’, ‘new
Beetle’, ‘face’ or ‘happy’, figure 1). In these processes, the information contents
Figure 1. The human brain typically performs multiple categorization tasks on a single image using task-relevant stimulus information. For example, the brain uses
coarse, global scene information to categorize this image as ‘street’ in a categorization task. By contrast, local details (i.e. other task-relevant information), as represented
by finer image resolution, support other categorization tasks, such as ‘cars and their make/model’ and ‘people’. As we will illustrate, in the stimulus information
representation (SIR) framework, samples of the stimulus are randomly generated and shown to participants to categorize (blue set). This approach generates variations
in the participant’s categorization behaviour (green set, e.g. ‘people’). Concurrently, participants’ brain activity is recorded using neuroimaging techniques (such as EEG
and MEG, see the red set) while they perform the task. The three-way interaction between these three SIR components (〈stimulus variation; brain; behaviour〉), as
represented by the colour-coded set intersection, enables us to better understand where, when and how task-relevant information is processed in the brain.
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2stored in memory play a critical role in transforming the
stimulus information that projects on the high-dimensional
retina into categorization behaviour. However, it is notor-
iously difficult to understand what these memorized
contents are, specifically. And without these contents, it is
impossible to develop and test the information processing
models of brain activity, the stumbling block of the neuroimaging
agenda.
To bridge the interpretation gap, we developed the stimu-
lus information representation (SIR) framework [4]. Specifically,
we show that SIR can characterize the stimulus information
contents stored in memory that are used to flexibly categorize
incoming stimuli, and in turn to reveal where, when and how
these contents are represented and processed in the brain.
SIR comprises three critical elements that enable this inter-
pretative step change: (i) rich stimulus variations with
precise control, (ii) an explicit control of behaviour via
specific cognitive tasks and (iii) a new analytical method-
ology that better decomposes brain activity (e.g. into that
which represents task-relevant, versus task-irrelevant fea-
tures). Though our applications of SIR are drawn from
vision, the approach, which is based on the framework of
psychophysics, is straightforwardly generalizable to any
sensory modality.
Analyses of visual categorization processes with SIR pro-
vide a useful test bed to discuss the reactivation of neuralactivity that represents specific information during memory
recall. For example, car experts would memorize the charac-
teristic shape of the ‘new Beetle’ in figure 1. More casual
observers could instead memorize general information
about the car, leading to the same car being represented
with different features in memory. Consequently, experts
and novices could generally recall or replay different features
about the same pictures. The key points here are first that
observers can only predict or reactivate the information con-
tents that they have memorized about a stimulus category
[5–8] and second that we can generally expect these contents
to vary to some degree across observers owing to relative cat-
egory expertise. Hence, if we aim to understand the
mechanisms that use memorized information contents (e.g.
for categorization, as we will illustrate, but also for prediction
and reactivation, as we will discuss), a useful starting point is
to characterize what these contents are, to be able to trace their
specific reactivation into brain activity, and thereby bridge the
interpretation gap.2. The stimulus information representation
framework
The SIR framework starts with a critical constraint––a cogni-
tive task––to limit what the brain is doing when we come to
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3analyse its activity. As illustrated earlier in figure 1, a single
stimulus can in principle recruit as many brain
representations and processes as there are possible categoriz-
ations. However, typical brain-imaging studies of visual
categorization are designed as if the stimulus (or a category
of stimuli, e.g. face, car or city) on its own is sufficient to gen-
erate and therefore control specific representations and
processes of the brain [9–11]. However, as illustrated, to
achieve this necessary level of control, we must constrain
the explicit cognitive task that the brain performs on the
stimulus [12–15]. Next, having circumscribed a task, we
then need to characterize the specific stimulus information
that supports this categorization in memory [13,16]. Other-
wise, we will not know what information the brain has
used to make different categorizations such as ‘Byres road’,
or ‘New Beetle’, ‘Face’ or ‘Happy’, from the same stimulus
(figure 1).
Such task-relevant information processing is a generic,
but often neglected, theoretical point that applies both to
the interpretation of any sensory categorization in the brain
and to its models. In the case of studies of memory, the
tasks performed on a stimulus, or a stimulus category, even
implicitly, impact the stimulus features that are memorized,
particularly so when the input is high dimensional [5,7,17]
(as in figure 1). In such situations, only partial, task-depen-
dent stimulus representations are learned, and so when this
stimulus is recalled, the current categorization task is likely
to influence the stimulus features that will be recalled [5].
The SIR framework has been used to address such task-
relevant information processing questions because it can iso-
late the specific stimulus information that drives variations in
the brain activity that in turn generate variations in behav-
ioural responses in a circumscribed task. For example, a
typical design in the sciences of cognition involves multiple
repeated trials of a specific task. SIR considers the three-
way interactions between concurrent trial-by-trial variations
of the three main components of such an experiment: stimu-
lus variation, brain activity and behavioural responses. We
will now detail each component and the procedure using
concrete examples from vision science.
(a) Stimulus variation
As we will illustrate with concrete examples, stimulus vari-
ation is crucial to explore, in a data-driven manner, a richer
palette of brain and behavioural responses, as illustrated in
figure 1. Stimulus variation can take different forms: it can
consist of images generated by the random selection of
pixels [16,18–20], or by sampling from the generative
models of complex stimuli [21–25]. Such stimuli (as described
in more detail below with images) are then presented to par-
ticipants, who are asked to categorize them. So, in this first
step, we randomly sample the variables that control stimulus
information on each trial (as represented by the blue set in
figure 1).
(b) Behavioural measures
The second component of SIR consists of measuring behav-
ioural variables in the performance of a categorization task
such as response accuracy, reaction time or confidence
ratings, on individual experimental trials (as represented by
the green set in figure 1). Critically, when participants
perform a categorization task on randomly generated stimuli,their behavioural responses can be used to disentangle what
stimulus variables are relevant to that categorization task
from those that are not. In this way, the participants’
behavioural responses can reveal in a data-driven manner
what information the participant (and therefore their brain)
selectively uses to categorize information as ‘Byres road’, or
‘New Beetle’, ‘Face’ or ‘Happy’ (figure 1). Simply stated, we
know the what of the information processing task.
(c) Brain measures
Next, to understand where, when and how the brain processes
the what (i.e. the task-relevant variables), we also measure its
activity while participants perform the categorization
task using various brain-imaging techniques, such as
electroencephalography (EEG), magnetoencephalogram
(MEG), functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), near
infrared spectroscopy (NIRS), electrocorticography (ECoG)
or single-cell recordings. The red-shaded set in figure 1 rep-
resents variables in brain activity recorded during a task, as
recorded by different sensors, at different sources or time
points, or three-dimensional voxels of bold activity, or
representing different neuron firing rates.
Together, the three components of SIR test how randomly
sampled stimulus information influences brain activity and
behaviour during a particular categorization task. In
addition, the three-way interactions among these three com-
ponents, as denoted by 〈stimulus information; brain;
behaviour〉, are represented as the four-colour-coded set of
intersections shown in figure 1 (that is, the blue, green and
red sets of the Venn-like diagram, and the white, light blue,
magenta and yellow areas where they intersect). With these
three-way interactions, we can then model the information
contents of the brain with unmatched interpretative
precision, as we illustrate in the following sections.3. Applying stimulus information representation
to model and understand task-relevant
information
Here, we illustrate how SIR brings these components together
to model, using reverse engineering, the processing of stimu-
lus information in the brain while it is performing a
categorization task. We first show the two-way interactions
before extending to the three-way interactions. In the first
three examples, we reverse engineer the information contents
of the face memory of individual participants (i.e. the what)
from the two-way interactions between stimulus variation
and three different face categorization tasks (i.e. face detec-
tion, face identity and facial expressions of emotion across
cultures). In the final example, we use the three-way inter-
actions (as represented by the white triple set intersection)
to reverse engineer where, when and how the brain dynami-
cally processes task-relevant (and task-irrelevant)
information in a perceptual decision task. We now review
these components of the SIR framework in turn.
(a) Face detection
Suppose we instruct each participant that they will see white
noise images (figure 2a) and that half of them comprise a face
well hidden in the noise (or, in another experiment, the letter
(a)
(b)
Figure 2. Reverse engineering the contents of face memory (adapted from [13,26]). (a) Memory contents from univariate pixel sampling [13,19]. Individual par-
ticipants only saw pixel noise on each trial but were instructed that a face was hidden in the noise on half of the trials. They were tasked to detect the face by
responding ‘face’ versus ‘no face’ on each trial. Following the experiment, we computed the classification image (i.e. the relationship 〈Pixel Noise; Face Detection〉)
to reverse engineer the information contents of the memory prediction for a face. (b) Memory contents from multivariate identity noise sampling [26]. Individual
participants saw six random identities controlled on each trial by a generative model of face information. This generative model involves local averages based on
gender, age and ethnicity, to which unique random residuals are added to generate random identities. In this experiment, randomly sampled identities were added
to the same gender, age and ethnicity as the target face (e.g. ‘Mary’, a Western Caucasian female of 36 years of age). On each trial, participants were tasked to
choose the random face that looks most like ‘Mary’ and to rate this similarity on a 1 to 6 Likert scale. Following the experiment, we computed the relationship
〈Identity Noise; Similarity to ‘Mary’〉 to reverse engineer the information contents of familiar face memory. We then compared the memory representations of ‘Mary’
(left panel) and ‘Peter’ (right panel) with the objective ground truth information that defines these familiar identities in the face model. Coloured vertices indicate
the vertices that faithfully represent ‘Mary’ in memory. Vertex colours in the scatter plots are reported as colour-coded vertices in the memory representations.
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4‘S’ hidden in noise). The trick here is that there is never a face
(nor a letter) in the noise stimuli; participants are only
presented with white noise. To resolve the task, each partici-
pant will use memorized information to predict what a face
(or letter) should look like and then match this prediction
with the incoming input—i.e. pixel noise presented on
each trial.A small positive correlation between the prediction from
memory and the noise drives the observer to respond ‘face’
(or ‘S’), even when the input is only white noise. We can
reverse engineer the memory prediction that guides such
decisions by correlating each individual pixel (which is
either black or white on each trial) with the corresponding
detection response of the participant (i.e. ‘face’ versus
royalsocietypublishing.org/journal/rstb
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5‘noise’ on each trial, or ‘S’ versus ‘noise’ in the other exper-
iment). The resulting classification image (figure 2a) models
the information contents of the memory prediction for a
face (or ‘S’ letter) in each participant [13,18–20]. In SIR, the
classification image is the light blue intersection that com-
prises the randomly sampled pixel variables (in the blue
set) that are relevant for task behaviour (in the green set).
A foundational justification for sampling white noise to
reverse engineer the information contents of memory is
based on the Volterra and Wiener system identification in
engineering. It states that we can identify a complex system
from a linear sum of subsystems Fi by estimating the kernels
fi of each subsystem Fi, where the kernels are the orders of
representation of information in memory [20,27–31]. For
example, the light blue intersection in figure 2a is the first-
order (i.e. pixel-by-pixel, univariate) kernel f1 captured by
computing the relationship 〈white noise pixel; detection
behaviour〉. Higher-order kernels can be added to this first-
order memory estimate, by computing 〈white noise pixeln;
detection behaviour〉, for each order n of nonlinear relation
between the sampled pixels—i.e. the f2 kernel of pairwise
pixel relations, the f3 kernel of triplewise relations and gener-
ally the fn kernel of n-wise pixel relations. This approach has
fruitfully modelled the way neurons process specific, low-
dimensional sensory attributes in visual [32], auditory
[33,34], memory [35] and somatosensory systems [36], see
[31] for a review.
A key advantage of such white noise sampling is the few
assumptions that it makes about the structure of information
in memory, letting instead a data-driven computation based
on behavioural responses to discover this structure as the fi
kernels of the Volterra–Wiener expansion. However, this
approach is impractical with images of realistic faces, objects
and scenes, where each individual pixel becomes a first-order
parameter to estimate, together with the many orders of
interactions between individual pixels that make up natural
image features. Furthermore, natural image features form
densely correlated clusters of pixels, whose occurrence will
be extremely rare if each image pixel is independently and
randomly sampled. Thus, the finite time of a human exper-
iment will make it practically near impossible to estimate
the memorized representations of natural image features
using white noise pixel stimuli. To address these shortcom-
ings, a fruitful approach is to hypothesize that memorized
information is structured and then embed the structuring
hypotheses as the explicit dimensions of a generative model
of the stimulus. The next examples apply this generative
approach in two different tasks.(b) Face identity
Here, the task is to identify a familiar face from memory [26].
What stimulus information should we randomly generate to
reverse engineer the memorized information that guides
this task? As discussed, a starting point is to hypothesize,
and then model, the information structure of real-world
human faces. We note that human faces are statistically
smooth, textured surfaces that systematically vary according
to their age, sex, ethnicity and, of course, identity. A good
model would therefore isolate the information that uniquely
identifies a face from that which is shared across faces to rep-
resent their age, sex and ethnicity. We formalized these
constraints within a linear model that separates the identitycomponent of a face (e.g. ‘Mary’) from the component that
represents their shared age, sex and ethnicity as a local aver-
age (e.g. the average of all 36-year-old Western white
females).
Equipped with this explicit model, we come back to the
original question of the identity noise that we should gener-
ate to reverse engineer the contents of familiar face memory.
Suppose that the target face is ‘Mary’, a 36-year-old Western
white female well known to her colleagues. To generate iden-
tity noise, we use the two-component model just discussed,
and within it set the local average to represent all 36-year-
old Western white females. We add to this shared average a
randomly generated component of identity as illustrated
with the six random identities in figure 2b. Critically, these
faces share the same local average age, sex and ethnicity as
‘Mary’ and only differ in identity. On each trial, we then
ask the participant to select the face (among the six pre-
sented) most similar to ‘Mary’ and to rate this similarity on
a 1–6 scale from ‘not at all similar’ to ‘very similar’. Following
the experiment, we compute for each participant the light
blue intersection 〈identity noise; similarity to ‘Mary’〉 for
each multivariate component that controls the shape identity
noise (and texture identity noise, not shown). The result
models the memory contents of a familiar face.
For each participant, we can then compare these memory
contents with the ground truth—i.e. the objective identity
information of the familiar face. To illustrate, grey faces on
the x-axis of figure 2b show the ground truth identity that
defines ‘Mary’ (and ‘Peter’) as Inward and Outward three-
dimensional shape deviations in relation to the shared local
average. For example, Mary’s nose is objectively thinner
than average and so these vertices deviate inward
(darker grey tones indicate increasing deviations). Likewise,
her more pouty mouth is shown as an outward three-
dimensional shape deviation. The y-axis of figure 2a uses
the same format to show the memory contents for ‘Mary’
in one typical participant, where colours indicate increasing
deviations. These contents reveal faithful representations of,
for example, a thinner nose and a pouty mouth. The scatter
plot visualizes the vertex by vertex fit between the memory
representation (y-axis) and the ground truth three-dimen-
sional face (x-axis). The white diagonal line provides a
veridical reference, where the identity component in the
memory representation is identical to the ground truth face,
for every single three-dimensional vertex.
There is an important difference between the white noise
used in the face detection example and the component iden-
tity noise used here. Whereas the white noise was pixel-by-
pixel (i.e. 32 × 43= 1376 univariate parameters), making few
assumptions about the structure of memory representations,
the multivariate identity noise (with 355 components of
shape and 355 components of textures = 710 parameters) is
derived from a generative model of real face information
that is laden with explicit hypotheses (i.e. linearity and inde-
pendence of identity from the age, sex and ethnicity factors).
Of course, both types of noise enabled the reverse engineer-
ing of task-relevant memory contents, at the level of
individual participants and with greater precision and
fewer parameters (and therefore trials to estimate them)
with the multivariate identity noise. However, a sceptic
would correctly point out that these more precise reconstruc-
tions are essentially model bound and that we are
compromising the open-endedness of a data-driven approach
Figure 3. Reverse engineering the contents of facial expression memory (adapted from [23]). On each trial, individual face movements and their 7 dynamic par-
ameters are randomly sampled to produce a 1.25 s facial animation (see coloured curves). Participants from two cultures are asked to categorize the animation by
emotion (6 classic emotions plus ‘other’) and intensity (on a 5-point Likert scale from very weak to very strong). Across trials, we model the memory representation
of each facial expression by computing the individual face movements (and their dynamic parameters) that are systematically associated with each emotion category
response and intensity level.
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6with each structural hypothesis—i.e. we can only reconstruct
the memory information in relation to the structural hypoth-
eses explicitly formulated in the generative model. This is
indeed an important point that requires careful consideration.
(c) Facial expressions of emotion
In this third example [37], we turn to the dynamic memory
information that guides the categorization of facial
expressions of the six classic emotions (i.e. ‘happy’, ‘surprise’,
‘fear’, ‘anger’, ‘disgust’ and ‘sad’) in two cultures (i.e. white
and East Asian). Here, we will again sample a multivariate
noise to reverse engineer the contents of facial expression
memory. However, as real-world facial expressions involve
specific facial movements called action units (AUs), we incor-
porate AUs and their dynamic parameters as structural
hypotheses of a generative model of random AU movements,
as illustrated in figure 3. On each experimental trial, Western
Caucasian (WC) and East Asian (EA) participants viewed a
1.25 s facial animation that randomly sampled and combined
a subset of multivariate AUs from a core set of 42 AUs. For
example, in figure 3, three AUs are selected: outer brow
raiser (AU2) colour-coded in green, lip corner puller
(AU12) in blue and lips part (AU25) in red. Each is activated
with a random movement (see colour-coded temporal acti-
vation curves for each AU; temporal parameters are
labelled in the green curve).
Participants viewed the facial animation, classified it
according to one of the six emotions and rated its intensity
on a 6-point scale (from ‘very weak’ to ‘very strong’). If the
facial animation did not correspond to any of these emotions,
participants selected ‘other.’ After many such trials, we
reverse engineered the memorized information for each
facial expression by building the light blue statisticalrelationship 〈AUs; expression category〉 between the dynamic
AUs presented on each trial (the blue set of stimulus variables
in the blue set) and the participant’s corresponding responses
(e.g. ‘happy’ figure 3, the green set of response variables). The
memory models revealed a culture-specific representation of
the temporal dynamics of emotional intensity. Specifically,
whereas EA participants represent emotional intensity pri-
marily with early movements of the eyes, WC participants
represent emotional intensity primarily with the mouth [37]
(see electronic supplementary material, Video S1). This diver-
gence is mirrored in the emoticons of popular culture, where
‘happy’ is represented with ‘^ ^’ in the EA culture and with
‘:)’ in the WC culture.4. Applying stimulus information representation
to model and understand task information
processing in the brain
So far, the examples have focused on reverse engineering
task-relevant information, the light blue, two-way inter-
action of the SIR framework (represented as the light blue
intersection between the blue set of pixel samples and the
green set of corresponding behavioural responses). Such
task-relevant features, represented as univariate features or
multivariate shape of expressive components, are pivotal
for understanding information processing in the brain
because they represent the stimulus features that the brain
must process to accomplish the behavioural task in question.
In other words, task-relevant features are the needles of
information that we should search for in the haystack of
brain activity. To find these features, we now intersect the
third component of SIR––in this last example, MEG signals,
(a)
(b)
Figure 4. Using SIR to study the processing of detailed information contents in the brain (adapted from [4]). (a) Task-relevant features from pixel sampling.
Random sampling of pixels across spatial frequency (SF) bands of an ambiguous stimulus using Bubbles [16]. Participants viewed the resulting sparse images
(framed in blue) and were tasked to categorize each as ‘Nuns’, ‘Voltaire’ or ‘don’t know’, while we recorded their brain activity (via MEG) and decision behaviour.
The pairwise relationship 〈Pixel; Decision〉 for each image pixel was computed to reveal task-relevant (light blue-shaded) features of each decision. (b) Brain
processing of task-relevant/irrelevant features. Three-way relationships were also computed to reveal task-relevant feature representation (the white triple inter-
section, white framed features) and task-irrelevant feature representation (the magenta set remainder of magenta framed features) in brain activity. With SIR
we showed where, when and how specific task-relevant features combine in the right Fusiform gyrus (rFG) into decision-specific representations. Pie charts standing
in for rFG voxels indicate the representational strength (computed from the triple relationship 〈Pixel; MEG; Decision〉) of the colour-coded task-relevant features
framed in white in panel. To illustrate, the blue and orange features respectively representing the left and right nuns faces in SF1 are selectively represented in rFG
voxel activity for ‘the nuns’ response, whereas the green feature representing the face of Voltaire in SF3 is broadly represented across rFG voxel activity for ‘Voltaire’
responses. The colour-coded plots and corresponding brains at the bottom indicate the strength of representation of task-relevant (left panel) and task-irrelevant
(right panel) features. Task-irrelevant features are initially represented and then dynamically filtered out in occipital cortex approximately 170 ms post-stimulus.
royalsocietypublishing.org/journal/rstb
Phil.Trans.R.Soc.B
375:20190705
7recorded on each trial in response to random stimulus
samples that are behaviourally categorized. We can now
explore the richer three-way interactions between stimulus
variation, brain measures and behaviour (as 〈stimulus
variation; brain; behaviour〉).
The following illustrates how this triple intersection pro-
duces the coloured intersections of SIR that can be used to
disentangle brain activity into the processing of task-relevant
stimulus information, the processing of task-irrelevant stimu-
lus information and other brain processes, to enrich the
interpretation of brain-imaging data. Figure 4 illustrates the
task [38,39], where each participant saw an ambiguous
image (stimulus) that can be perceived as being either ‘the
nuns’, or ‘Voltaire’ (squint to see the latter, figure 4). In this
task, the green set consists of the participants’ response vari-
able across trials, which can either be ‘the nuns,’ or ‘Voltaire,’
or ‘don’t know.’ As before, to understand the task-relevantinformation for each of these responses, we systematically and
randomly sampled the image to reveal different pixels to a par-
ticipant on each trial. The blue set shown in figure 4 thus
includes each image pixel as a distinct stimulus variable (with
‘on’ or ‘off’ values), based on random sampling across trials.
Using the blue set of randomly sampled image pixels and
the green set of corresponding behavioural responses, we then
infer the task-relevant stimulus features for each perception by
computing 〈pixel; behavioural decision〉, using (mass-bivari-
ate) pairwise relationships. This computation disentangles all
image pixels into those that are relevant for task behaviour
(i.e. for participants to categorize an image as being ‘the
nuns’ or ‘Voltaire’, as represented by the light blue intersection
shown in figure 4) from those that are not (which are
encompassed in the remainder of the blue set), just as before.
To find where, when and how the brain processes these
light blue, task-relevant pixels we intersect the third
royalsocietypublishing.org/journal/rstb
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8component of SIR: MEG signals, which were recorded during
the task. We then compute the overlapping co-representation
of the stimulus features into the behaviour and brain measures
(as 〈pixel; MEG; decision〉). The outcome of this computation
identifies the light blue task-relevant features that the red set
of MEG variables represent, as highlighted by the white
triple intersection of the three components of SIR.
Zhan et al. [4] used these three SIR components to trace
the dynamic flow of task-relevant features that were pro-
cessed between 50 and 220 ms post-stimulus, from their
early representation in the visual cortex, through the ventral
pathway. In the ventral pathway, they found that task-
relevant features converge onto a few MEG voxels at the
top of the right fusiform gyrus, approximately 200 ms
post-stimulus, where they agglomerate into distinct represen-
tations that support each behavioural decision (see the
colour-coded ‘task-relevant’ features in figure 4 and their cor-
responding colour-coded pie chart representations between
170 and 220 ms post-stimulus on the rFG voxels). Thus,
using the three-way interaction between the components of
SIR, Zhan et al. traced the dynamics of task-relevant feature
processing over the first 220 ms post-stimulus, from their
early representation in visual cortex to their integration for
each behavioural decision in the ventral pathway.5. What do we learn from the intersections
of SIR?
To re-cap, in the example just reviewed, we have three con-
current datasets in the SIR framework: the blue set of
stimulus information samples, the red set of brain measures
and the green set of behavioural responses in a task, along
with their four intersections (coloured white, light blue,
magenta and yellow, as shown on figure 1). The white
triple set intersection is transformative for neuroscience and
neuroimaging because it disentangles the different relation-
ships between stimulus, brain activity and behaviour as
follows. The white set divides each coloured intersection
into the white component and a remainder. Each of these
four intersections contributes its own unique component of
interpretation to provide a more detailed understanding of
the processing of information contents in the brain. We
review each intersection in turn.(a) The light blue intersection
Within a given task, the light blue remainder set isolates and
represents the task-relevant features that the recorded brain
measures do not represent. This remainder flags a de facto
incomplete explanation of the processing of the stimulus
information that supports a particular behaviour. This is
because all task-relevant features should be represented
somewhere in the brain to influence behaviour. A complete
brain measure (such as that captured by a brain-imaging
modality) should entirely absorb the light blue remainder
(of task-relevant features) into the white set intersection (the
light blue remainder is empty in the example shown in
figure 4, where the white framed task-relevant features are
all processed for behavioural decision in the brain).(b) The magenta and yellow intersections
A magenta remainder reveals task-irrelevant stimulus fea-
tures, which the brain represents but which do not directly
influence behaviour in the task. In figure 4, the information
processes reduce (i.e. filter out) a travelling wavefront of
task-irrelevant feature representations within occipital
cortex, around 170 ms post-stimulus (compare the magenta
‘task-irrelevant’ features and brain in figure 4 to the white
‘task-relevant’ counterparts). Importantly, although these
task-irrelevant features do not influence the participants’ cat-
egorization responses, they were among the features that
were most strongly represented in brain activity in early
visual cortex. However, they do not reach the fusiform
gyrus in the ventral pathway, as the task-relevant features do.
Finally, the yellow remainder isolates brain activity that
relates to a behaviour but not to stimulus variation. These
brain processes likely reflect other aspects of the task, such
as modulation of arousal, response planning, response bias,
execution and so forth.6. General discussion
Here, we argued that the information contents of memory are
the cornerstone of the most influential models of prediction,
representation of categories in memory and categorical
decision. Although these models are all implicitly cast
within an information processing framework, the challenge
is now to precisely specify what this information is, and
where, when and how the architecture of the brain dynamically
processes it to produce behaviour. We reviewed SIR, a frame-
work that can address these challenges in individual
participants while they are actively performing an explicit
task. During such tasks, stimulus variations are applied on
each trial to cause concurrent variations in the participant’s
brain activity and behaviour. Here, using three face tasks,
we illustrated how SIR can reverse engineer, in a data-
driven manner, the task-relevant information contents of
memory by computing the two-way interactions between be-
haviour and the univariate, low-structured pixel noise (in face
detection), or the multivariate, hypothesis-rich components
of a generative model of face shape or movement (in face
identity or emotion, respectively). Note that such designs
could have been augmented by changing the participant’s
brain activity with a cue [40], with direct interaction using
repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) [41–43],
or other methods, thereby changing the information sampled
and behaviour. We argued that task-relevant features are the
needles of information that we should search for in the hay-
stack of brain activity and computed the triple interactions of
SIR to do so (represented as the coloured intersections). With
these, we showed how we can trace the processing of task-rel-
evant and task-irrelevant features in the brain between
stimulus onset and behavioural decisions.7. Using rich stimulus variations in a task to
infer information contents at recall
Our applications of SIR identified the variety of stimulus fea-
tures that can represent a visual category in the memory of
individual participants. We also showed how we can track
neural representations of these features into the variations
royalsocietypublishing.org/journal/rstb
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9of dynamic MEG activity (and also in other measures such as
EEG [12–15], fMRI [44] and single-cell recordings [45]). Our
analyses use the important interactions between the
bottom-up random variations of stimulus components and
their top-down usage guided by memorized knowledge.
Using these we can separate out the representation of task-
relevant from task-irrelevant features in the brain [4]. In
SIR, an explicit generative model of the stimulus is necessary
to produce the variations of stimulus features that can tap
into multiple categorizations of the same stimulus (or cat-
egory). These considerations also apply to identifying the
memory contents supporting different categorizations of a
single face (e.g. identity, emotion or social trait), or different
levels of expertise of the same object category (cf. ‘new
Beetle’ versus ‘car’ or ‘German Shepherd’ versus ‘dog’ or
‘New York’ versus ‘city’). As we will discuss, we can
design hierarchical generative models to tap into taxonomies
of categories in memory.
Turning to cued recall of information contents from
memory, we can use the SIR framework to start addressing
two broad questions. First, how can we establish what infor-
mation a specific brain activity recorded during recall
represents (whether EEG, MEG, fMRI or single unit recording)
and how does this relate to the information represented during
encoding? Second, what are the effects of the explicit behav-
ioural task, both during encoding and at recall, on the
information represented, and how do these interact? Though
there is at present no methodology to address these questions
directly, we refer the reader to figure 4 to start considering
how the information contents derived using the SIR frame-
work could inform information-rich studies of cued recall. In
figure 4, we used a perceptual categorization task and com-
puted the rich variety of stimulus features that each
individual participant processed to enable the response ‘the
nuns’ (i.e. the fine-grained left and right nuns’ faces) and ‘Vol-
taire’ (i.e. the coarser face of Voltaire and his eyes). Let’s now
examine how we could use this analysis to inform the infor-
mation contents of brain activity during recall.
We could compute the explicit MEG signature of each one
of the stimulus features at encoding (as was done in [12,46]).
We could then compare the neural signatures of the specific
features of each participant with the activity elicited when
the participant would recall each perception in the absence
of an explicit stimulus, for example with a cross-decoding
analysis (train classifier during encoding, test at recall) as
has been successfully applied to fMRI [47,48], EEG/MEG
[49–53] measures. The balance of represented features might
change between encoding and recall depending on the task
considered in each. Such an approach could establish a simi-
larity of brain activity between stimulus encoding and recall
and, via the analyses of SIR, indirectly inform the specific fea-
tures that a participant activates when recalling ‘the nuns’ or
‘Voltaire.’ This thought experiment could generalize to studies
of the information contents of other face, object and scene cat-
egorizations, between their encoding and recall.
Stepping back from the example, we make an explicit,
functional theoretical point about the information contents
of memory: the representation of any stimulus category
should at least comprise the stimulus features that afforded
its multiple categorizations in the history of the individual
categorizer [5,7,8] (e.g. a variety of features to categorize the
relevant identities, expressions, ages, ethnicities and social
traits for faces, and the taxonomic categorizations of theobjects and scenes at the required levels of expertise [54]).
The SIR framework provides the analysis tools to identify
what these features of the stimulus are in memory. Conse-
quently, even recalling the same scene stimulus could elicit
different neural activity if we tasked the participant with
recalling whether the cued stimulus is a city, New York, or
a view of the Chrysler building, because these categorizations
would require different functional features, each with a
specific neural signature.
We have focussed so far on cued recall, where the frame-
work of SIR (including rich stimulus variation of multiple
stimulus features and explicit consideration of task) has
clear applicability. However, this approach could also give
insights into information-bearing reactivations during offline
replay. For example, a richer design including multiple
stimulus features and different tasks could reveal that the
specific feature representations reactivated during offline
replay differ depending on the explicit task performed
during learning. Here again, the SIR perspective could be
combined with existing cross-decoding approaches, enhan-
cing them with the key features of carefully designed rich
stimulus variation and explicit control of the cognitive task.
In the offline replay setting, there are no explicit behavioural
responses, but we might still expect to see an effect of the cat-
egorization task during sequence learning on the specific
nature of the offline replay.
8. Extension to events, situations and sequences
We now sketch how generative models could be extended to
the object [21] and scene categories [22] making up events
and situations. Consider designing the generative models of
two city scenes built around one prototype plus a specific
component that identifies each scene. At testing, the scene
component would be randomized and discrimination per-
formance measured. With reverse correlation, we could
reverse engineer from behaviour the features that each par-
ticipant represents in memory for each scene. We could
then use the framework of SIR to compute the encoding
models of each component and test whether we can elicit
similar brain activations for prediction or recall, when faced
with a blank screen. A similar approach could be applied
to the design of articulated object categories [21]. However,
the main drawback of such approaches is the large exper-
imental time that such an experiment would require, unless
the generative model was itself multivariate (e.g. different
blocks of buildings to generate the two scene categories,
rather than individual buildings) and we could develop
encoding models of these multivariate components in the
brain. These expansions are part of our on-going research.
Our methodology is also in principle extensible to studies
of memory that use structured sequences, where the specifi-
cation of a task is also important. For example, the
sequential replay of a memorized sequence of images similar
to figure 1 might differ depending on whether the participant
was asked to count the total number of people versus the
total number of cars visible in the sequence.
9. Conclusion
Generalizing from our examples, using a range of modern
imaging modalities, we can now measure on individual
trials the brain activity of an individual participant while
royalsocietypublishing.org/journal/rstb
Phil.Trans.R.Soc.B
3
10they are actively performing an explicit task. SIR takes full
advantage of these richer datasets by computing the inter-
actions between these three components, as 〈stimulus
variation; brain; behaviour〉. These computations can then
be used to disentangle the stimulus, brain activity and
response spaces, including at different granularities, depend-
ing on the specific experimental design. From these, we make
inferences about what information is being processed in the
brain for a particular behaviour, and where and when this
processing occurs, which in turn can inform computational
models of behaviour. SIR can also be applied to study any
parametrizable sensory stimulus spaces (e.g. auditory
[24,25,34,55], as well as other cognitive, social and affective
tasks; for reviews see [23,56,57]) and to study the information
processing mechanisms of both brain and in silico architec-
tures. We propose, therefore, that the time is ripe to exploit
the full capabilities of modern brain-imaging technologies
and to embrace richer designs that exploit the trial-by-trial tri-
variate 〈stimulus information; brain; behaviour〉. The analysis
of such richer designs within the SIR framework may revealnovel interactions that further our understanding of how the
brain processes information contents for behaviour.
SIR provides a number of benefits for studies of memory
recall and replay. As we have seen, by focusing on explicit
tasks performed on a remembered stimulus, or stimulus cat-
egory, SIR can specify the information contents that must be
recalled to facilitate behaviour and then guide the search
for replay of that specific information in brain activity. As
with categorization and visual perception, an increased
focus on explicit task control and task-relevant information
content is critically important to understand the information
contents of memory.Data accessibility. This article has no additional data.
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